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Abstract: 
What is the thread that connects all the various actors and events that contributed to the rise 
of piracy in Somalia? The paper addresses the evolution of Somali piracy, focusing on its 
emergence, since it is that transformational aspect that provides the most richly insightful 
perspectives. Working from Thomas, Kiser and Casebeer’s Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent 
Non-State Actors, an excellent foil for understanding how violent non-state actors (VNSAs) can 
arise into power in various situations and circumstances, connections are made to actual 
events and circumstances that contributed to a rise in piracy in Somalia.  Among the various 
sources, another inspiration for linking events, actions, and actors is Violence at Sea: Piracy in 
the Age of Global Terrorism, with its thorough information on how piracy is actually carried out 
and on how the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea created opportunities for piracy to 
flourish in incapacitated states. The main ambition of the paper is to integrate the different 
understandings, since they are currently generated for different purposes, of these various 
aspects of Somali piracy, as well as to illuminate the factors that led to this phenomenon, in 
addition to exploring what we can learn from these explanations and outcomes. How various 
states have reacted, and whether, and how, or to what extent, those responses have different 
impacts on the evolution of Somali piracy, will be followed by proposals to address the 
contributing factors of Somali piracy. This will round off the discussion. 
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1 – Introduction 
 
In 2005, there was a noted upsurge of piracy, or armed robbery at sea, emanating 
from the Somali coast. Prior to this phenomenon, several factors fused together and 
contributed to a tumultuous and dangerous environment where frustration rose and 
legitimate opportunities for stable livelihoods became scarce. Illegal fishing in Somalia’s 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by foreign vessels, unlawful dumping of toxic and nuclear 
waste off Somalia’s coast, the expansion of Somalia’s already difficult to monitor national 
seas, and the disastrous effects of the Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004 all provided Somalia with 
devastating environmental and social consequences. These and other factors proved 
powerful and transformative, occurring in a region with a weak to nonexistent central 
government and a history of violence and bloodshed. This combination of factors layered 
obstacle over obstacle and made their impact that much more significant. 
 
1.1 The Research Question 
Somali pirates often label their actions as that of Somalia’s Coast Guard or Navy. 
The closest Somali translation of the term coast guard is badadinta badah, or saviors of the 
sea, while pirate translates to burcad badeed, or ocean robber (Bahadur 2011). While 
outsiders might see their actions as those of ocean robbers, could it be that the Somali men 
were executing “a legitimate form of taxation levied in absentia on behalf of a defunct 
government that [they] represented in spirit, if not in law” (Bahadur 2011)? This is a main 
question I investigate in this thesis.  
In this paper, I employ a human ecology approach to better understand the 
phenomenon of Somali piracy. I intend to identify the initial motives of the pirates, 
investigate what aspects of Somali culture and history have impacted the formation of 
Somali pirates, and understand what factors and actors contributed to this phenomenon. 
Furthermore, I seek to understand the nature of influence that these factors and actors have 
had. While other authors have written about these factors distinctly, there is no text yet 
that draws them all together for comprehensive analysis, which is a main reason I seek to 
identify the plethora of factors that contributed to the rise of Somali piracy. In order to 
analyze and assess how these factors and actors contributed to the emergence of the 
violent non-state actors (VNSAs) that have come to be known as “Somali pirates,” I 
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implement the framework set forth in an important contribution to understanding the 
formation of VNSAs, Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors (Thomas, Kiser and 
Casebeer 2005). Using it as a theoretical guide, I pair the text with events and actors in the 
context of Somalia. To borrow terminology from Warlords Rising, Somali pirates are a 
unique species of VNSA (2005), one that I seek to better understand. In my effort to 
accomplish this, I incorporate the notion of relational fields (Langlais 1995; Goldstone 2004). 
I use this tool to explore the transformation that occurred and also elaborate on the 
expansion of the tangled web of actors after the badadinta badah formed.  
While the main aim of the text, as stated above, is to analyze the genesis of this 
VNSA and to identify the factors that aided in its construction, some significant relationships 
and actors involved in the progression of Somali piracy after the upsurge are also 
highlighted. I also examine the methods and actions that various governments have 
employed in their attempt to thwart piracy in the region. This assessment of the strategic 
effectiveness of counter-VNSA (C-VNSA) approaches in the short- and long-term considers 
what can be learned about VNSAs and C-VNSA strategy in general—especially in situations 
of political instability, socioeconomic despair, and environmental and social injustice. 
 
2 – Research Methods and 
Description of Their Use 
 
Because of the comprehensive nature of the research question, my research strategy 
consisted of collecting information from a wide range of text sources, ranging from 
theoretical, journalistic, and historical articles; reports, and books.  
The research began with an investigation of theoretical sources. Using a human 
ecology approach, I explored the phenomenon of Somali piracy and how it was greatly 
influenced by societal relations to the environment1, as well as by dynamics of power. 
Human ecology is particularly suited to a study of this nature because it supports analyzing 
the object of study as a complex system. I relied on the work of Garrett Hardin and Gerald 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 By environment I refer to the physical landscape in which the Somali people live, but I also include other 
non-human organisms, including, for example, livestock, fish, and vegetation, in my definition. 
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L. Young, one of the pioneers of human ecology. Hardin says, “the science [of human 
ecology research] is inescapably interdisciplinary” (1986, 69); it incorporates concepts from 
sociology, cultural ecology, anthropology, psychology, economics, geography, and political 
ecology (Young 1974), and as piracy in Somalia includes issues related to each of these 
disciplines, but cannot be comprehensively addressed by only one of them, a human ecology 
approach was fitting for this research.  
Starting from a human ecology foundation, I incorporate the concept of relational 
fields. The notion of relational fields was first developed by Richard Langlais in 1995 during 
his research concerning the people, region, and culture associated with Ellesmere, and in 
which he aimed to map Ellesmere’s relational field, or what could be referred to as the 
ecology of Ellesmere. What this means in a theoretical sense is that Langlais sought to 
incorporate an approach that was not restricted by geographic or disciplinary boundaries in 
order to sufficiently complete his research. Although Young did not specifically use the term 
“relational field,” he did indeed begin to cognize the concept in 1974. He explains, “It seems 
reasonable that if you can isolate ‘where’ an organism is located and determine its 
distributional pattern and the nature of its spatial interactions, you have proceeded quite a 
way forward explaining its relationship with its environment” (Young 1974, 83). He also 
adds that because of the globalized nature of human society and human relationships that 
such a study concerning humans as the organisms in question cannot be geographically 
restricted (1974, 83).  
Langlais builds on this and explains that, “An understanding of the global 
interrelatedness of human activities reveals that it is increasingly difficult to separate what at 
first glance seem to be distinct problems from one another” (1995, 1). What this means is 
that in order for a phenomenon to be sufficiently studied, it must be analyzed within its own 
context. This includes relationships that, though seemingly unrelated to the main object of 
study, are in fact meaningful. This must also be considered in order for the phenomenon to 
be wholly understood. This is a concept that guides this research to reveal how internal and 
external interference has influenced the status and growth of piracy in Somalia. I also show 
how the history of this issue, as well as the potential resolutions, greatly involve state and 
non-state actors from within Somalia and around the globe. It is an interconnected and 
multi-faceted phenomenon involving elements of culture, power, and the environment.  
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Since Langlais’ coining of the concept, relational fields has since been adopted by 
researchers in a variety of fields2, most prominently those concerned with climate change, 
security, and mapping social realities—issues concerned with the function of networks and 
complex relationships that are not necessarily confined to a particular region or people. 
According to Langlais, issues that combine ecology or environment (or ecology and 
environment) with security are found in disparate locations (1995, 7), but by unifying the 
concepts as part of a relational field, they can be studied together. In other words, using the 
organizing structure of relational fields allows for “the totality of the relations that are of 
relevance for a study” (1995, 21) to be considered in the research—including non-state 
actors, as well as actors and relationships not confined to one particular region. Although 
this research concerns Somali pirates, there are many factors and actors inside and outside 
the country that have contributed to their formation, thus further supporting a relational 
fields approach. 
Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer’s Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors 
(2005) and Lehr’s Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism (2007) proved both 
theoretically and practically insightful for my research. Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer offer a 
thorough understanding of VNSAs. They focus on organizing and assessing the conditions 
that motivate VNSAs, such as pirates. Accordingly, their text provides the theoretical 
framework with which I analyze Somali piracy. Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer state that, “Five 
specific factors stand out in relation to VNSA formation and existence: resource scarcity, 
demographic pressures, socio-economic deprivation, organized crime and corruption, and 
pre-existing identity cleavages” (2005, 25). An identity cleavage is the, often sharp, division 
between individuals or groups of people. When differences (for example, between clans) 
exist, leaders can choose to exploit these differences for various purposes, such as 
recruitment.  
As a complement to Warlords Rising, Violence at Sea overviews how piracy operations 
are carried out and includes introductions to the impacts that international governments 
and policy makers can have when they decide to involve themselves with maritime 
governance. These concepts are important for understanding the factors and actors 
involved in the formation of Somali piracy and for providing insight on what makes for 
effective or ineffective C-VNSA strategy.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Texts such as Forms of knowledge: A psychoanalytic study of human communication by Anna Aragno (2008), 
“Learning Networks and National Response to Global Climate Change: the Case of Japan” by Jeffrey 
Broadbent (2009), and “Compelling intimacies: domesticity, sexuality, and agency” by Aaron Goodfellow and 
Sameena Mulla (2008).  
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In order to understand influential aspects of the genesis of piracy, this research 
investigates issues around Somali geography, culture, history, and politics. This information 
was obtained through articles from peer reviewed journals, books (those mentioned above), 
institutional reports3, and news accounts and interviews from news media sources based in 
Somalia as well as internationally. I gave special credence to texts written by dedicated 
researchers and current and ex-military with extensive expertise on Somalia and/or security 
issues in general. I also made an effort to use only Somali sources of news or news media 
sources from reputable international news companies, such as the BBC. The peer reviewed 
articles and previous research dealt primarily with piracy in Somalia, its root causes, and 
proposed solutions to Somali piracy, as well as theory related to human ecology and violent 
social movements. The result of such an approach is that “the fieldwork [is not] defined a 
priori by the actual fieldwork project [or the object of study] but rather emerges out of the 
ongoing data-gathering process” (Hirvi and Snellman 2012). What this means in practical 
terms is that my “field” was not predetermined at the outset. Instead, it was derived and 
demarcated from the information obtained throughout the data-gathering process. 
Additionally, in research such as this, where primary sources of information cannot be 
obtained, owing to immobility for some reason or another, the research that is gathered is 
filtered through the perspective of those who have produced the secondary research (Hirvi 
and Snellman 2012). While this does not negate the findings derived from such research, it 
is still important to acknowledge the limitations of such a method.  
Using these same sources and approach, I obtained information regarding the history 
of piracy in Somalia, how piracy operations within Somalia are conducted, and the many 
actors involved in the illegal enterprise. Since I was unable to obtain direct first-hand 
information from Somali pirates, Somali residents, or ex-patriots who have encountered 
piracy, I have instead utilized anecdotes provided from both Somali and international news 
media sources. The significance of my work is that I am bringing these sources together to 
produce a comprehensive overview of VNSAs in general and specifically in Somalia. I do this 
to be able to evaluate and propose potential solutions to piracy in Somalia. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 While I relied on the World Bank’s 2013 report on Somali piracy as a source of information regarding piracy 
operations, its defense of illegal international (including Western) fishermen was questionable and therefore 
necessitated further speculation and analysis. This will be further discussed in section 4.3.6. 
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3 – Theoretical Framework 
 
 The study of the rise of piracy in Somalia is perfectly suited to the field of human 
ecology. The complexity of the relationships of the actors involved is also suited to the 
concept of relational fields. In this section I elaborate on why I have chosen these specific 
theories and concepts as the organizing principles to apply to my text. Subsequently, in 
order to expand on the role and power of violent actions, I introduce the work of 
Goldstone on violent forms of social protests and social movements, as well as Thomas’, 
Kiser’s, and Casebeer’s work (2005) on the theory and background on the formation of 
VNSAs.  
 
3.1 – Human ecology  
Human ecology involves the study and analysis of the relationship(s) between 
societies and the environments in which they live. With this object of study in mind, “human 
ecologists [tend to] think that humans should be studied as living systems operating in complex 
environments” (Richerson, Borgerhoff Mulder, and Vila 2001). In other words, it is necessary 
when using a human ecology approach to address the ecology (or ecosystem) of the society in 
question. It’s an approach for incorporating such a notion and focuses on the significance 
and role of each “organism” within the ecosystem of study.  
Since Somali piracy involves a multitude of distinct and varied issues, it could be 
studied with many different perspectives, however, as human ecology is a field that 
“interpenetrates with other fields of study” (Young 1974, 58), it can take advantage of the 
strengths and unique elements of other disciplines and then be applied to multi-faceted 
research of this nature. Additionally, it is crucial that I study the influence of culture and 
power dynamics with regards to this phenomenon. The additional factor of societal-
environmental interconnectedness in this case is another justification for such an approach.  
Human ecology researchers must understand that “[organisms] can never do merely 
one thing” (Hardin 1986, 69). What this means is that it is absolutely essential to 
acknowledge and assess the interconnectedness and dialectical nature of actors and 
relationships when carrying out a study—to not do so would be to ignore the element of 
inherent relatedness in all “ecosystems.” Studying a particular phenomenon as solitary and 
singular is not possible in the social-ecological world in which we live. To apply the words of 
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Young: “It is generally accepted that ecology […] is a unity. But it is a unity of such 
complexity that one individual may be unable to comprehend its totality. In such a situation, 
the only available course of action is to operate upon the whole by operating upon each 
part” (1974, 2). By following Young’s advice and “operating upon each part,” I can 
determine which individual actors and which specific factors and conditions played a part in 
the ecology of piracy.  
The phenomenon of Somali piracy is highly complex and greatly influenced by the 
region’s relationships to internal and external actors. One way of looking at the interaction 
between actors involved in the formation of Somali piracy is through the metaphor of a 
web, with each actor functioning within the common ecosystem. As specified by Young, 
“Analysis of structure and organization (of the parts, their interaction, and the pattern of 
their collectivity) [is] a prerequisite to understanding […] the total group community or 
system” (1974, 62). As this thesis focuses on the total network, or the ecology, of Somali 
piracy, it is mandatory to distinguish the barriers between actors and shine light on their 
relationships and functions. Researching these interactions and niches allowed me to trace 
the cause-and-effect trail that resulted in the phenomenon of Somali piracy.  
 
3.2 – Relational fields  
It would be a mistake to consider the issue of Somali piracy as one that lies strictly 
within Somalia, which is why the relational field of Somali piracy must be studied. For 
example, consider Langlais’ own research concerning the region of Ellesmere. He writes: 
“there is a growing awareness in Ellesmere that many of the social, financial and 
environmental problems that they [the population residing there] are faced with are 
generated in places and by people and processes previously considered to be too far away 
to worry about” (Langlais 1995, 25). Similarly, while pirates did indeed emerge in the region 
of Somalia, the factors and actors that contributed to their development were not limited to 
the geographic area of Somalia itself. According to Langlais, “Security, from a perspective of 
human ecology, is found between the entities, the individuals, the actors, the organizations 
and institutions in the relations” (1995, 24). What this means in the case of Somali piracy, is 
that there are a variety of idiosyncrasies that need to be considered in order to understand 
why the country became a haven for this activity.  
 
3.3 – Violent social movements  
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Goldstone’s work on violent social movements also develops the relational field as 
an organizing structure. He explains that studying relational fields is specifically useful for 
tracking movements across time and space and that “such studies should aim to identify the 
key elements and relationships of the external relational field” (2004, 358).  He writes, 
“accounts of individual social movements should pay attention to the group- and issue-
specific characteristics of a movement’s external environment, and how those elements 
relate to each other and to the group in shifting patterns over time” (2004, 358), and 
furthermore, “more detailed analysis of the specific context of individual movements is 
required to understand their [actors such as protesters’] dynamics, and for that, I believe it 
is essential to map out the full range of relationships with other actors and groups that 
affect their activity” (2004, 356). Given this, it is essential to question what motivates 
individuals or groups to mobilize and take action (against the state) especially using the 
means of collective violence. Goldstone elucidates that social movements often involve 
individuals located “outside the polity,” acting as “challengers” that seek to effect change 
with alternative methods when they are failed by traditional political processes (2004, 335). 
In other words, it is non-state actors often acting out of desperation, that are eager to 
initiate improvements to their livelihood that the state cannot, or will not, provide and in 
doing so attempt to contribute to a sea-change. To put it plainly, “Social movements have 
most often been depicted as acting on behalf of the economically struggling or 
disadvantaged, seeking greater economic justice in sharing society’s wealth and economic 
opportunities” (Goldstone 2004, 335). While some may argue against piracy as a movement, 
in the case of Somalia, the people had an unstable, unreliable, barely functioning government 
that was unable to defend itself from harm from outsiders, and even from damage from 
within Somalia itself. As a result, people took matters into their own hands.  
 
3.4 – VNSA formation  
Thomas4, Kiser5, and Casebeer6 provide insight into the process of the formation, 
development, and growth of VNSAs (2007). With regards to the use of collective violence, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 At the time of the book’s publication, Troy S. Thomas was an officer in the United States Air Force with 
experience in intelligence operations and defense policy. He had also previously been an Assistant Professor of 
Political Science at the US Air Force Academy, a Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 
and holds an MA in Operational Studies from George Washington University—as well as from the US Marine 
Corps School of Advanced Warfighting. He has extensive knowledge on national security and foreign relations. 
5 Steve Kiser was, at the time of the publication, a Major in the US Air Force and Commander of the 614th 
Space Intelligence Squadron. He holds MAs in Asian Politics and a PhD in Policy Analysis. He is an expert in 
terrorism strategy, counter-strategy, and security issues worldwide. 
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they explain that collective violence is not random or opportunistic, but rather “a tool to 
achieve goals” (2005, 9-10). They add that, “Collective violence is really an extension of 
collective action, which is coordinated action by members of a group in pursuit of common 
ends” (2005, 10). What this means from the perspective of a VNSA, is that violence serves a 
tactical purpose. For example, in 2005, armed Somali men from the Marahen clan 
“impounded” Taiwanese trawlers fishing in Somalia’s EEZ. The men demanded a fine of 
$15,000 per crewmember on board the Taiwanese vessels for their illegal fishing. The 
Somali men urged that they were acting as the National Volunteer Coast Guard of Somalia 
and that the demand of such a fine was justified for the trawlers’ poaching in Somalia’s EEZ 
(Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 5). These men used violence as a means to (1) instill fear in the 
foreign poachers, (2) obtain money, and (3) deter international vessels from operating in 
Somalia’s EEZ. In this case, their use of collective violence, or rather the threat of collective 
violence, was deemed necessary to accomplish those goals. 
Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer assert that certain conditions must be present in order 
to create the right context for the formation of VNSAs, explaining, “mutually reinforcing 
factors coupled with failures of governance and identity mobilization are the most common 
set of conditions correlated to [VNSAs]” (2005, 25). When such conditions exist, VNSAs 
can be found in the form of “warlords, TCO [transnational criminal organizations], militant 
religious movements, ethno-political groups and ideological or interest-based groups” 
(Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 122). In the following section, I investigate and describe 
how the previously noted conditions contributed to the formation of the specific species of 
VNSA known as Somali pirates.	  
 
4 – Findings 
There is a vast web of actors and events that contributed to the rise of piracy in 
Somalia. In this section (using the framework set forth by Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer), I 
explore the events and integrate the actors whose illicit activities contributed to greater 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The last author of Warlords Rising is Williams D. Casebeer. At the time of publication he was a Major in the 
US Air Force and an Air Force intelligence officer. He has an academic background in political science, 
philosophy, and Middle Eastern studies, with a PhD in Cognitive Science and Philosophy. Like the other 
authors, Casebeer is also highly experienced and knowledgeable regarding terrorism and security, as well as 
military ethics (Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 253-254). 
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political, environmental, and social upheaval in a region already prone to violence and 
instability. Somalia’s cultural practices and history are reviewed in order to better 
understand the circumstances that invited various exploiters to commit the acts that they 
did, and in doing so created a situation in which piracy became a viable option for many to 
earn an income and exact revenge.  
 
4.1 – Conditions for the formation of VNSAs in Somalia 
There are many forms of action that social protest can take outside the state—and 
they can often be quite shocking to those in favor of using state channels. “Elections, 
legislative votes, and court decisions are quite different in their conduct and content from 
protest marches, demonstrations, or boycotts” (Goldstone 2004, 336), and yet piracy is 
even more extreme. However, those who are disadvantaged and facing financial hardships 
often drive social movements. These challengers seek economic justice, a share of society’s 
fortune, and economic opportunities to be able to sustain their livelihoods (Goldstone 2004, 
335), which is just what the pirates have fought for. However, becoming a VNSA often 
requires more prolonged periods of socioeconomic deprivation, for it is often those who 
have perpetually or historically felt marginalized, the ones constantly struggling to sustain 
themselves, that are the most likely to mobilize, especially through violent means 
(Goldstone 2004, 345). Additionally, in a report for the Bonn International Center for 
Conversion (BICC)7 (an independent non-profit organization that focuses on global issues of 
peace and conflict), Grosse-Kettler asserts that simply being unsatisfied with one’s social or 
political situation is not enough to motivate people to carry out collective violence. Rather, 
those who are continually economically marginalized may seek to seize economic 
opportunities themselves, by any means, rather than wait for the state to offer it to them or 
to provide opportunities for them to obtain it through honest work (2004, 4). While this is 
a crucial component of the formation of VNSAs in Somalia, there are also other 
contributing factors. Elements such as resource scarcity, demographic pressures, and 
socioeconomic deprivation are reliable predictors for collective violence (Thomas, Kiser, 
and Casebeer 2005, 78).  
In order to better understand the international security challenge that is Somali 
piracy—and to prepare for similar situations around the world, we must first understand 
how such a VNSA came to be. In my quest to map the ecology of Somali piracy and better 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See more at http://www.bicc.de/ 
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understand this VNSA, I have noted at least ten factors8 that contributed to the rise of 
piracy in Somalia. They are:  
 
1. Environmental issues especially related to resource scarcity, 
2. Governmental instability and a history of colonization,  
3. Existing identity cleavages,  
4. Subclan ties, 
5. The impact of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,  
6. Illegal fishing in Somalia’s EEZ by foreigners,  
7. Illegal dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters,  
8. The financial lure of piracy,  
9. Political corruption, and  
10. Additional factors.  
 
In the following section I give an overview of Somalia’s geography, culture, and history to 
set the stage for understanding each of the ten factors. These factors illuminate the issues 
and conditions the Somali people faced that drove some of them to become pirates. By 
investigating this topic I hope to enable others to view Somali piracy with a deeper 
understanding and to begin to consider how to best improve such hostile and hazardous 
situations around the world now and in the future. 
 
4.2 – Situating piracy: Somalia’s geography, culture, and history 
Before discussing the factors behind the rise of piracy in Somalia, it is important to 
contextualize the phenomenon within the country’s geography, culture, and history.  
 
4.2.1 – Somalia’s geography 
The officially titled Federal Republic of Somalia is located at the Horn of Africa and 
has one of the longest coastlines in Africa, with a total of about 3,300 kilometers (or over 
1,800 miles). The shoreline is characterized by vast sections of cliffs with many areas of 
inshore coral reefs (World Bank Group 2013b, 136). The land itself varies between plateaus, 
plains, and highlands with generally dry climate (Central Intelligence Agency 2014). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 There is no hierarchy or ranking of these factors. 
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Figure 1: Somalia is bordered by Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya; its coasts encounter the Gulf of Aden and the Indian 
Ocean. The region of Puntland is also distinguished on this map. 
 
This map has been made available from the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook (2014). 
 
4.2.2 – Somalia’s culture 
Despite such an arid climate and difficult terrain, Somali people remain generally 
pastoral and nomadic (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 8). Many of these nomadic pastoralists live 
alongside their livestock and travel with their herds in a constant search for the best 
availability of food and water, even crossing borders into Kenya and Ethiopia to do so. This 
has, at times, created conflict between Somalis and their neighbors (Dehérez 2009). In 
general, Somalis are considered to be “among the world’s poorest and hungriest people, 
with an adult literacy rate that may be lower than 20 percent in some parts of the country, 
an average life expectancy of only 42 years, and a mortality rate for children under five that 
exceeds 25 percent” (Kaplan 2010, 88). These statistics illustrate the hardships prevalent in 
the lives of most Somalis. 
A Somali tradition that helps the Somali people to support each other through the 
many obstacles within the region is that of the clan system. The clan system is a major facet 
of Somali social life and culture. Socially, Somali culture “is based on a lineage system in 
which an individual’s identity and status are derived primarily from patrilineal descent and 
primogeniture” (World Bank Group 2013b, 137). The major clans involved in this social 
system include the Darod, Hawiye, Dir, Digil, Issaq, and Mirifle clans, which are broken into 
smaller divisions of the clans, each with their own social structures and leadership (World 
Bank 2013b, 137). Accordingly, most Somalis identify themselves as belonging to a specific 
clan or subclan (Rhinehard 2011). Clan ties, based on lineage and territory, are the basis by 
which Somalis pursue and establish relationships and build trust.  
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While the clan system dictates much about Somali lifestyle, it is also related to 
Somali notions of governance. Since subclans in Somalia “tend to be highly localized and 
defined by territory as well as lineage […] each group’s traditional notion of governance is 
rooted in regulation of its own territory” (World Bank Group 2013b, 137), rather than in 
that of a central governing authority. In lieu of a central body, each social unit and subunit 
puts their trust in its chiefs and elders who act as the leaders (World Bank Group 2013b, 
138). Although there are some worries that the younger generation of Somalis is beginning 
to disregard the influence and leadership of elders (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 9), this traditional 
political and social structure remains highly influential in Somali society (Kaplan 2010, 82). 
An example of how clan politics transpire is when conflicts occur, both within and 
between clans. Should dissension arise, clan or subclan members look for advice from clan 
elders (who traditionally function as mediators in conflict), as well as to xeer (Grosse-
Kettler 2004, 9). Xeer is another key feature of Somali social structure and governance. It 
involves a mix of Islamic shari’a law and customary law (Idarat Maritime 2011). Xeer 
functions as a legal framework with which behavior and actions are regulated, monitored, 
and settled, and is quite comprehensive, involving regulation of the “collective payment of 
diya9 (or blood money, usually paid with camels and other livestock) for death, physical 
harm, theft, rape and defamation; maintenance of inter-clan harmony; family obligations; 
[and] resource-utilisation [sic] rules” (Idarat Maritime 2011). It is a strategy for managing 
most aspects of Somali life. 
A unique feature of xeer is that it is a system of law that is not based on an 
individual’s actions, but rather between groups10 (Idarat Maritime 2011). This characteristic 
proves highly relevant to understanding piracy operations and motives. Due to this cultural 
understanding, that an action committed by one is a responsibility that is shared by the 
group (the diya group specifically), Somalis may understand foreigners that they interact 
with in the same context. What this means in a practical sense with regards to piracy in 
Somalia is that if a Somali pirate is killed in action by the military force of another country, 
“the Somali diya-paying group to which the pirate belonged will see it as their duty to seek 
the payment of diya from the country concerned, and if this is not forthcoming they will see 
it as their entitlement to revenge the dead pirate” (Idarat Maritime 2011). The killing of one 
from the same country in which the military force belongs is acceptable because they are all 
seen as belonging to the same “clan” that was responsible for the death of their comrade. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  A diya paying group “usually consists of a few hundred or a few thousand Somalis” (Dehérez 2009, 7). 
10 In the context of Somalia, this means groups of men. 
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Even though the slain pirate was carrying out violent actions and endangering the lives of 
others, and even though the targets of the revenge may have had nothing whatsoever to do 
with the death of the pirate, the retribution will be seen as justified (Idarat Maritime 2011). 
While xeer is a crucial element of Somali culture, there is another important aspect 
that also interacts with the country’s economic sector. It is that of the hawala11 system, also 
known as remittances12. Nearly 50 percent of the population of Somalia is unable to 
generate income for themselves. Instead, they rely on money sent from relatives abroad, 
members of the Somali diaspora (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 19). The hawala system is not 
incredibly strict or structured—dissimilar from banking systems in many other parts of the 
world. Rather, “The system is based on trust [and is] combined with the use of clan-
affiliation and personal memory acting as a kind of identity card” (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 20). 
The hawala system’s so-called money houses or banking houses are situated around the 
world and the informal nature of the practice reduces traceability and regulation (Grosse-
Kettler 2004, 20). Though hawala is often used innocently and out of need by many Somalis, 
the international reach and lack of transparency of the system means that it is also used for 
illicit purposes, and, in fact, has been put to significant use by Somalia’s pirates with 
businessmen from around the world reportedly having been involved in the pirates’ 
enterprises13 through the system (Hunter 2008). 
 
4.2.3 – Somalia’s political history 
In order to better situate the context in which piracy occurred, in this section I 
overview Somalia’s history from its period of colonial rule until the upsurge of piracy in 
2005. Since I am concerned with how what transpired influenced this distinct rise in Somali 
piracy, I will not focus on post-2005 events. 
After periods of Portuguese, Italian, and British colonialism, Somalia gained its 
independence on July 1, 1960. A coup, supported by Somalia’s own military forces following 
Major General Muhammad Siad Barre, occurred on October 21, 1969 and was followed by 
a period of cooperation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This ended in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Hawala, or hawilaad, means transfer in Arabic. 
12 Remittance networks replace banks in Somalia, and they are used by many Somalis to receive money from 
relatives living abroad as part of the Somali diaspora (SBS News 2014). 
13  Pirates market their endeavors to potential investors, just as one would any promising business 
opportunity. This system allows investors from around the world to participate in piracy schemes. The 
investors use the hawala to transfer money to Somalia and help finance a piracy operation. When a ransom is 
paid after a successful hijacking, the pirates again use the hawala to transfer money back to the investor and 
ensure that the backer receives the return on his/her investment (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 20). 
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1977 when USSR military advisors were thrown out as part of the Ogaden Conflict. In 1980, 
Barre invited United States forces to military bases in Somalia in order to assist in 
protecting the country against attacks from neighboring Ethiopia (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 
8-9).  
Barre’s power derived from what is referred to as the MOD-alliance; “M” for 
Marahen, “O” for Ogaden, and “D” for Dhulbahante—all clans that were affiliated with 
Barre through kinship networks (Dehérez 2009, 8). An unintended consequence of such an 
alliance “of privileged and favored clans [was] the alienation of major clans from the regime, 
such as the Hawiye or Isaaq, and even more importantly to the alienation of clans from each 
other” (Dehérez 2009, 8). As a result of the turmoil caused by his favoritism, during his final 
years in power, Barre was challenged by more than ten movements of clan-based resistance,  
“which began to carve up the country into autonomous fiefdoms” (Kaplan 2010, 83). This 
was a major factor in future inter-clan conflicts in Somalia. 
In December of 1990, “Somalia’s armed forces, Barre’s original power base, had 
dissolved into armed groups largely based on clan identities, loyal to former commanders 
who also happened to be tribal chiefs” (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 8-9). Barre’s leadership 
finally collapsed in January of 1991, after which, inter-clan conflict worsened, governmental 
powers became non-operational, and previous military members offered their skills to clan-
based militias and warlords (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 9). Although there was some degree 
of order in the autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland, much of the country 
continued to operate under anarchy, leading to the involvement of international actors 
attempting to reconcile the clans and solidify a national government (Kaplan 2010, 83). The 
situation in 1992 was worsened when more than a million Somalis were threatened by 
starvation and millions more were vulnerable to acute malnutrition (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 
10-11). The ensuing tension between various Somali factions and international military 
efforts, particularly those of the US, culminated in the infamous Black Hawk Down incident, 
leading to the withdrawal of US forces in March of 1994 (Kaplan 2010, 84). One year later, 
United Nations involvement ended as well (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 8-9; Kaplan 2010, 85). 
In the following years, the temporary national government (TNG) of Somalia was 
formed. It has been reported that, “While the TNG gained limited international recognition 
particularly from the United Nations and attracted some 50 million US dollars in aid from 
the Gulf states, it never succeeded in controlling more than isolated pockets of the country” 
(Grosse-Kettler 2004). Furthermore, this attempt at forming a central political authority in 
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Somalia lacked transparency, cross-clan collaboration, and reliability14—and some regions 
refused to participate in the TNG at all15 (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 10). The temporary federal 
government (TFG) that followed in 2004 proved to not be much more effective.  
Despite the fact that “the TFG [had] no budget, no functioning civil service, and 
almost no control over the security forces that act in its name[, the] TFG, nonetheless, is 
recognized by the international community as Somalia’s legitimate government” (Kaplan 
2010, 85). In the absence of a functioning government, Islamic groups began to develop, 
especially in southern Somalia (Kaplan 2010, 85). However, these Islamic groups actually had 
a somewhat stabilizing effect with their establishment of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 
the early 2000s (Kaplan 2010, 85). This new form of governance provided a degree of 
order, diminishing some of the chaos at the time, and included subclans in its administration. 
Although, many Somalis disliked the strong religious aspect of the ICU, they appreciated it 
for its inclusiveness of clan leadership and for the organization it instilled (Kaplan 2010, 89).  
This review of Somalia’s history, from colonial rule to 2005, has exhibited that 
Somalia is dealing with a variety of crises, namely statelessness, lawlessness, and armed 
conflict (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 8). This history and situation of political instability and 
violence created opportunities for some individuals to take advantage of the turbulence. In 
the section below I introduce the ten factors that contributed to the rise of piracy in 
Somalia by explaining the impact of internal actors, external actors, and significant events 
and relationships that make up the ecology of Somali piracy. 
 
4.3 – Factors and actors that contributed to Somali piracy  
 
4.3.1 – Environmental issues  
The first factor I identified as contributing to the formation of Somali piracy involves 
environmental issues, specifically those related to resource scarcity. Thomas, Kiser, and 
Casebeer note that, “political scientists, sociologists, environmentalists, and even prominent 
politicians have reflected their belief that resource scarcity and environmental degradation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “The Transitional National Government (TNG) was announced in August 2000 as an attempt to rebuild a 
political authority in Somalia. This cross-clan and supposedly national government was headed by Abdiquasim 
Salad Hassan as President. All TNG political leaders, however, are linked to a cartel of key Mogadishu 
businessmen, which again shows that business is the authority rather than politics. Furthermore, the TNG is 
accused of having linkages to Islamic fundamentalist organizations. In effect, it has not gained sufficient authority 
to create some sort of public order” (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 9). 
15  “Somaliland, Puntland and the Bakool and Bay regions in south-west Somalia have never participated in the 
TNG” (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 10). 
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(which often go hand-in-hand) have a place in security discussions” (2005, 26). They explain 
that research reveals that cases of limited resources are often connected to anxiety, 
splintering, and even ultimately the collapse of the state in question (2005, 26). In the case of 
Somalia, there are many ways that such a scenario has affected the nation.  
There have been many occasions throughout Somalia’s history where “the scarcity 
of land has fueled inter-clan rivalries, especially when specific clans have had access to 
government resources and posts, while others have been marginalized and not represented 
in the country’s political landscape” (Dehérez 2009). Although, this secondary issue of 
governmental representation was mostly relevant in Barre’s time, his MOD alliance left its 
mark. Conflicts between clans have traditionally been managed between clan elders through 
respect and understanding, yet the exclusion of some clans has jeopardized this system. This 
has contributed to conflict in Somalia in two major ways: “First, sharing resources such as 
pastures is on the decline, giving way to inefficient use of the country's natural resources. 
Second, conflicts over land can now easily escalate into inter-clan rivalries” (Dehérez 2009, 
13). The issue of political favoritism further aggravated conflict over competition for limited 
resources in Somalia thereby complicating an already challenging situation. 
As stated above, many Somalis remain nomadic pastoralists that travel with their 
herds to wherever they can find the most arable land and water (Dehérez 2009, 7). When 
territory is already fought over and grudges are held between clans, the competition for 
Somalia’s resources becomes fiercer. Foreign policy analyst, Seth Kaplan, clarifies, “Somalia’s 
clans are highly cohesive internally but highly divisive externally. In other words, social 
cohesion exists within clans but not between them. And each clan has little or no interest in 
sharing the resources it controls with other clans” (Kaplan 2010, 91). This explains why 
much of the inter-clan fighting beginning in the 1970’s was fueled by access and competition 
for land, water, and other resources (Dehérez 2009), including charcoal, khat 16 , and 
livestock (Ashenkazi and Ceska 2009). This fighting also contributed to the damaging of 
these resources, and therefore a far worse situation for sustaining their livelihoods 
(Dehérez 2009). 
A major event that contributed to even greater resource scarcity in Somalia and 
diminished opportunities for economic prospects in the form of fishing, was the Boxing Day 
tsunami in 2004. The tsunami contributed to the deaths of between 40,000 and 50,000 
Somalis and resulted in the destruction of many coastal Somalis’ fishing gear (Lehr and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Khat (or qat) is a mildly narcotic, non-addictive leaf chewed by men in the region (Ashenkazi and Ceska 
2009). 
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Lehmann 2007, 14), wiping out the previously profitable enterprise of fishing and robbing 
gainfully employed fishermen of their source of income (Weldemichael and Hassan 2012). 
This made many men frantic for a way to put food on the table, and perhaps earn a little 
extra. With the marked increase in Somali piracy occurring just after this event in 2005, 
these disastrous consequences may have proved to be the final straw that broke the camel’s 
back.  
 
4.3.2 – Governmental instability and a history of colonization  
The second factor that contributed to the rise of piracy in Somalia is the country’s 
history of political instability, partially stemming from its periods of Italian and British 
colonial rule. Prior to World War II, there were more than 50 countries in the world, yet 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were nearly 200 (Thomas, Kiser, and 
Casebeer 2005, 7). Essentially, “In a geo-politically dizzying pace, vast empires were replaced 
with weak and dysfunctional states, often incapable of running their own bureaucracies, let 
alone defending themselves from threats from without—or within” (Thomas, Kiser, and 
Casebeer 2005, 7). In the case of Somalia, Italy and Britain differed in their approach to 
colonialism and therefore left two distinct legacies.  
In the previous British protectorate of northwestern Somalia, clan structures 
remained intact during its period of colonization, but in Italian-occupied southern Somalia, 
these structures were aggressively undercut (Dehérez 2009). In the absence of a strong 
central government to unify the country, the result of the British approach was a more 
politically stable and autonomous zone in the northern regions, while the Italian legacy is a 
more politically unstable environment in the south, with many leaders attempting to gain 
control. Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer maintain that if a state is incapable of managing its 
affairs, such as in the case of Somalia, then “alternative authority mechanisms emerge to fill 
the void” (2005, 59). Consequently, in Somalia, control is competed for and disputed by 
businessmen, warlords, pirate bosses, insurgent groups, and those who wish to appoint a 
leader of a central governing body (World Bank Group 2013b, xxv). While these actors 
fight for authority within Somalia, they leave the country unable to protect itself from 
exploitation. 
When citizens perceive states as illegitimate, incapable, or excessively coercive, this 
can lead them to understand the state as a barrier to their pursuit of an improved existence 
(Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 63). In this case, it was clear that the Somali 
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government would be of absolutely no help to improving the livelihoods of its people. In 
such situations, when governments are unable to “provide basic service, more young men 
and women [look] to non-state groups to provide access to food and housing” (Thomas, 
Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 36). When the state cannot provide what its citizens need, they 
turn elsewhere in search of opportunity, even if the opportunity is criminal. This is a major 
reason why leaders of illegal activities in Somalia, such as warlords and pirate bosses, have 
been able to recruit so many to become their militias, junior pirates, and even prostitutes. 
Somalia is considered by Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer to be a “black hole of state 
power.” In such an absence of governance, the space can then be “occupied by powerful 
figures that build [VNSAs]” (Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 60). What this means in a 
practical sense in terms of piracy, is that in order for pirates to succeed in their endeavors, 
they must operate in what is known as an enabling environment. In Somalia, the enabling 
environment is created by “the absence of a central authority willing and capable to uphold 
law and order, the dissolution of such law-enforcement agencies into clan-based militia, and 
squabbling warlords provide an excellent environment for the spread of illegal activities, 
among them organized crime and terrorism” (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 11). So far, this 
notion has proved to be accurate since piracy has prospered in areas where there is 
disputed state control, boundary conflicts, and weak or absent governance (Mak 2007, 202). 
What this means for the future, is that as long as Somalia remains an environment of 
statelessness, without feasible economic opportunities (especially in coastal communities), 
piracy will prosper (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 20). 
 
4.3.3 – Identity cleavages  
Issues of socioeconomic deprivation combined with political instability are further 
complicated by what Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer refer to as an identity cleavage, the third 
contributing factor to Somali piracy. They explain that, “where identity cleavages exist or 
can be created, the potential for mobilization is high” (Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 
63). However, they are careful to point out that just because differences exist between 
groups of people, does not mean that they will inherently be in conflict with one another. 
Rather, they attribute such divisions to an individual that seizes the opportunity to exploit 
existing differences, one they term an identity entrepreneur.17  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer refer to such an individual as an identity entrepreneur, someone who has a 
“vested interest” in exploiting differences and creating conflict between distinct groups (2005, 63). 
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In Somalia, there have been conflicts between clans, conflicts within clans, conflicts 
between Ethiopians and Somalis, and conflicts between Kenyans and Somalis—not to 
mention the conflicts between Somalis and international militaries intervening in these other 
conflicts. Intensified by issues such as resource scarcity, fueled by droughts and competition 
for resources, “a history of inter- and intra-clan competition and European colonization has 
left many areas without functioning institutions” (World Bank Group 2013a). These events 
have actually created two distinct, yet equally significant, notions of identity cleavages in 
Somalia: that of a group of organized citizens against another group of organized citizens, 
and that of the Somali people versus the state itself. 
 Compared to inter-clan skirmishes, the identity cleavage between the Somali people 
and the so-called state has created a very different sort of conflict. Thomas, Kiser, and 
Casebeer clarify that “With failures in governance resulting in a loss of regime legitimacy 
and undermining the notion of ‘citizenry,’ identity cleavages further serve to alienate the 
individual from the state and lure them toward non-state actors” (2005, 63). Additionally, 
once “a properly primed population” begins to see the state as ineffective and lacking in 
authority, potential recruits are more easily drawn toward identity entrepreneurs (Thomas, 
Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 85). In other words, all it takes once the government is seen as 
untrustworthy and unreliable to its citizens, is one convincing pirate leader to be able to 
recruit new members to his cause. In addition to this outcome, the Somali people have 
shown little desire to support a central governing body—in fact several regions have already 
declared themselves to be independent but are not yet recognized internationally (World 
Bank 2013b). This separation of society and state has perpetuated and nurtured the piracy 
sanctuary that is Somalia. 
 Piracy operations are carried out by different clans and subclans within Somalia, and, 
in their unity against the state, they have found ways to work together for their cause. Many 
non-state groups in Somalia have been able to cooperate through either kinship affiliation or 
a mutually beneficial arrangement. For example, in order for piracy to be successfully carried 
out in Somalia, the pirates require a secure anchorage point in which to hold the ship until 
its owner pays the demanded ransom. Therefore, alliances must be made between the 
pirates and those who control the safe anchorage points. Despite the very different goals 
and methods these non-state actors may have, this has resulted in pirate groups cooperating 
with the Somali Islamist insurgent group al-Shabaab on an ad hoc basis (World Bank Group 
2013b, 73). By being able to put their differences aside and consider their main goals 
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(economic returns and continued statelessness18 in Somalia) these two non-state actors can 
continue to work together. This collaboration between clans, subclans and other non-state 
actors has helped to stabilize piracy networks and, therefore, enabled piracy to flourish in 
the region. 
 
4.3.4 – Subclan ties 
Somali piracy would not have been able to grow had it not been for the social 
networks that exist as part of the clan system. Therefore, the fourth factor that contributed 
to the rise of piracy in Somalia is subclan ties. When facing common challenges and threats, 
individuals put their kinship networks to use. As a result, piracy operations in Somalia were, 
and still are, supported by clans and subclans throughout the country. Thomas, Kiser, and 
Casebeer explain that around the world, many groups are bonded by feelings of sharing a 
common fate or common identity (2005, 75). They expound, “A sense of subjective 
interdependence or shared common fate with other group members simply depends on the 
recognition that group members share similar interests or face a similar threat” (2005, 77). 
However, they also assert that it takes much more than the existence of such groups and 
the sharing of a common fate to transform them into VNSAs (2005, 79). It is mostly when 
such groups exist in an environment of violence and statelessness that they become 
especially susceptible to mobilization (Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 75). Furthermore, 
whether or not an individual becomes committed enough to join a VNSA depends on 
whether or not the individual has anything to gain from the VNSA (Thomas, Kiser, and 
Casebeer 2005, 76). 
Between Barre’s coup and 2005 there have been only minimal means to enforce law 
and order in Somalia, and the central government that would have that responsibility is ill-
equipped to do so. In the absence of such authority, pirate leaders have been able to 
manipulate their social networks to build up piracy operations. While the clan tradition 
provides a support system to the Somali people, “These traditional alliances [also] often 
form the basis on which militias are recruited and business-cartels are built” (Grosse-Kettler 
2004, 9). This unfortunate side effect of such a social structure demonstrates the function of 
networking in Somalia, the methods by which Somalis establish and pursue relationships and 
build trust based on one’s lineage and territory.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 While some species of VNSA require a situation of violence but also some measure of political stability in 
order to be successful, species such as pirates can only exist in situations of statelessness (Thomas, Kiser, and 
Casebeer 2005, 128). 
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The planning and decision-making for piracy operations are usually carried out in 
small groups, made of individuals from the same clan or subclan, with two to five “investors” 
supporting a powerful leader (World Bank Group 2013b, 75). Piracy operations also require 
individuals to act as crewmembers, guards, and militias—and such individuals are chosen 
carefully. Those selected for such positions are usually drawn from an influential clan or 
political body. In this way, aside from the labor capital these individuals provide, their social 
ties secure political support for piracy operations (World Bank Group 2013b, 7). What this 
creates is what is referred to as political capital (World Bank 2013b, 7), which is considered 
to be “The mixture of political, clan, and militia connections that allows a pirate or pirate 
advocate to influence political leaders to condone piracy” (World Bank 2013b, 107). 
Obtaining political capital allows pirate groups to be certain that their operations can be 
carried out—everything from purchasing weapons and khat, to maintaining a recruiting base, 
and, most importantly, to preserving the use of secure anchorage points for hijacked ships. 
 
4.3.5 – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
The fifth factor that contributed to the rise of piracy in Somalia is that of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS provides a legal framework for all 
activity on the seas, covering rules and regulations related to “the extent of territorial seas, 
navigation rights of naval and commercial shipping, states’ right over the ocean’s economic 
resources and the resources of the sea bed, a comprehensive regime for environmental and 
pollution control, scientific research[,] the settlement of disputes” and, of course, piracy 
(Murphy 2007, 155). However, UNCLOS does not address acts of piracy committed in 
territorial waters  (Murphy 2007, 155), which is where most pirate attacks occur in Somalia. 
Such acts in territorial waters are therefore referred to as armed robbery at sea, although 
there is no practical difference between the two. 
UNCLOS was formed in the era after WWII when numerous new states rose as a 
result of decolonization. It was also at this time when concerns of resource scarcity were 
rising (Murphy 2007, 156). Accordingly, states sought to own larger areas of potential 
resources and wanted stricter control of said areas. Therefore, the concept of an EEZ was a 
major theme of the discussions.  
The proposal of the EEZ was derived from most countries’ desire “to control and 
exploit the natural resources that they believed existed in abundance in and under the sea” 
(Murphy 2007, 158-159). The result of such a desire was that each country’s EEZ was 
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expanded from three miles off the coast to up to 12 miles (Murphy 2007, 158). While this 
change provided each state with a greater area of resources, it also made the already 
difficult to patrol territorial waters off the coast of Somalia even more unmanageable. States 
that were already at a disadvantage and unable to protect their three mile EEZ, were now 
responsible for an area four times larger than the original, which further limited their 
capabilities to deal with issues such as piracy, illegal fishing, and illegal dumping (Murphy 
2007, 165). Somalia’s incapacity to govern itself made it even more impossible for the 
country to consider and address dangers from outsiders.  
The expansion of the EEZ was impactful because of its role as a reinforcing factor. 
Reinforcing factors are dangerous because “taking actions that exacerbate [the root causes 
of recruitment], can construct a fertile environment that will encourage rather than hamper 
violent non-state actor [ontogeny19]” (Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 80). While 
reinforcing factors are not cited as one of the five main factors that contribute to VNSA 
formation, they are still significant because they support the conditions for VNSA formation. 
In this case, as a result of Somalia’s inability to enforce its rights, many outsiders disregarded 
the country’s EEZ, thereby further fueling Somalis’ disdain for such international actors.  
A tertiary impact of UNCLOS involves its lack of support for piracy occupied 
waters. While UNCLOS gives rights to individual coastal states, it offers no additional 
assistance to countries lacking the ability to address violations such as piracy. Therefore 
“Where [territorial] waters fall under the jurisdiction of states that have the will and means 
to police them, piracy has not gained a foothold” (Murphy 2007, 165), but, in the case of 
states that are unable to implement security measures, pirates conduct their operations 
freely, since no rules exist to force seaside nations to carry out sanctions or police pirate 
activity (Murphy 2007, 172). Since there are no mechanisms provided by UNCLOS for such 
states to be able suppress piracy, pirates are able to take advantage of this opportunity. 
Aware of where they can and cannot operate without threats, pirates cleverly move in and 
around various jurisdictions to successfully carry out their operations (Murphy 2007, 166). 
 
4.3.6 – Illegal fishing by international vessels 
Poaching in Somalia’s EEZ is the sixth factor that contributed to the formation of 
piracy in Somalia. Fish stocks have always been an important resource in Somalia, however, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Ontogeny is defined as “all the developmental events that occur during the existence of a living organism” 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica Online 2014).  
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the coastal Somalis’ reliance on their fishery resource has made them susceptible to fishery-
related risks. Accordingly, when fish stocks were jeopardized, this led to other serious 
consequences. According to Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer, environmental issues such as 
resource scarcity can often result in social disorder and state instability (2005, 26). They add 
that, “severe environmental scarcity can increase economic deprivation and disrupt key 
social institutions, precipitating ‘deprivation’ conflicts, such as civil strife and insurgency” 
(2005, 26). Furthermore, worsening environmental conditions can, when combined with 
issues of insufficient governance, enhance such conflicts (Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 
27). Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer conclude that, “This combination of forces encourages 
resource capture, the marginalization of the poor, rising economic hardship, and a 
progressive weakening of the state” (2005, 27). In the text below, I describe how illegal 
fishing by foreign vessels then further exacerbated Somalia’s already precarious situation.  
Illegal fishing by foreign vessels began after Barre’s collapse in 1991 and is widely 
considered as the impetus for Somali piracy (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 12). With the Somali 
government unable to protect its recently expanded national seas, foreign fishing fleets 
moved in to catch the fish flourishing off Somalia’s coast. The waters off coastal East Africa 
have abundant schools of tuna, sardines, mackerel, and even the more lucrative species of 
lobsters and sharks (Tharoor 2009; Middle East Online 2008). Due to Somalia’s inability to 
police its waters, the low-tech approach used by Somali fishermen, and the chance of a 
significant pay-off, fishing vessels from Spain, India, Thailand, Russia, Korea and other nations 
looted Somalia’s seas of these highly valued species (Ashenkazi and Ceska 2009). 
Not only did these international fishermen poach in Somali’s EEZ, they also used 
internationally prohibited fishing equipment, including  “nets with very small mesh sizes and 
sophisticated underwater lighting systems, to lure fish to their traps” (Middle East Online 
2008). Additionally, these fishermen also used the method of steel-pronged drag fishing, 
which severely damaged Somalia’s reefs (Bahadur 2011), thus further spoiling the Somali 
seabed.  
In addition to the damage the foreigners’ fishing methods had on Somalia’s oceanic 
environment, they even purposefully damaged the Somali fishermen’s equipment, including 
ramming the Somalis’ smaller boats (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 13). Some Somali fishermen 
have even reported being shot at and hosed with water cannons by the poachers (Tharoor 
2009). While there was a period in the early 1990’s where Somali fishermen and illegal, 
international fishermen peacefully coexisted in Somalia’s EEZ (Weldemichael and Hassan 
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2012), tensions escalated when “Foreign trawlers ventured ever closer to the beaches, thus 
depriving even Somali inshore fishing vessels of their catch” (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 13). 
What complicated this problem even further was the involvement of Somalia’s 
warlords. Prior to 2001, Somali warlords began the extremely profitable business of illegally 
selling fishing licenses to these international vessels wishing to exploit Somalia’s rich seas 
(Grosse-Kettler 2004, 23). Due to the illicit nature of this business deal, there are no 
records on the amount of false licenses purchased or the amount of fish caught, nor are 
there records of which specific fishing companies were involved (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 23-
24). However, it is estimated that there were at least 200 foreign vessels engaging in illegal 
fishing along the Somali coast between 1991 and 1999 (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 12-13), an 
industry worth about US$300 million per year (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 13; Tharoor 2009). 
Additionally, the High Seas Task Force (HSTF) claims that at one point in 2005, there were 
at least 800 illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) vessels operating in Somalia’s EEZ, 
poaching an estimated US$450 million in seafood annually20 (Project Censored 2010). With 
their actions, the foreign poachers in Somalia’s EEZ, “steal an invaluable protein source from 
some of the world’s poorest people and ruin the livelihoods of legitimate fishermen” 
(Project Censored 2010). Boyah, a former fishermen turned pirate, now laments that after 
years of happily catching lobsters, the spiny crustaceans can no longer be found off the coast 
of his hometown of Eyl (Bahadur 2011). 
After years of watching their territorial waters exploited by illegal foreign fishermen, 
many coastal communities eventually decided to fight back (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 13). As 
this conflict of deprivation worsened, “impoverished Somalis living by the sea have been 
forced over the years to defend their own fishing expeditions out of ports such as Eyl, 
Kismayo and Harardhere — all now considered to be pirate dens” (Tharoor 2009). In the 
spirit of vigilantism and in order to exact revenge and protect their territory, piracy 
emerged as an attack on encroaching foreign trawlers. During the 1990’s, the early days of 
Somali piracy, those who seized illegal trawlers were able to rely on easy ransom payments 
since the vessels did not want to face punishment for their violation of UNCLOS (Tharoor 
2009). But this movement that started out as a form of security and self-defense became a 
much larger and more complex endeavor once the badadinta badah realized that they had 
an opportunity to take ransoms from the 25,000 mostly unarmed ships passing through its 
waters every year (Washington Times 2009).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This increase from US$300 million to US$450 million is due to the increase in vessels illegally fishing in 
Somalia’s EEZ. 
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In a BICC newsletter, Ashenkazi and Ceska explain that Somalia’s situation of 
statelessness has had three main impacts: (1) the cessation of pirate operations on land is 
seemingly impossible, (2) Somalia’s seas remain vulnerable to pollution and poaching from 
more developed nations, and (3) that piracy stands as one of Somalia’s only means for 
economic growth and influx of cash. They also add that regional absence of development 
has created an eager pool of potential recruits (2009). These issues continue still as illegal 
fishing in Somalia’s EEZ persists and unemployment in the region remains high 
(Weldemichael and Hassan 2012). 
Before continuing, it is pertinent that I address the issue that the World Bank argues 
against this contributing factor. As this perspective contradicts the rest of my findings 
concerning the impact of illegal fishing, it is important that I resolve this incongruence. Its 
2013 report on piracy states that, “While illegal fishing has often been associated with 
overfishing and the depletion of fish stocks available to Somali fishermen, the data do not 
reflect that” (World Bank Group 2013b, 58), even claiming that, in fact, Somali waters are 
“underexploited” (World Bank Group 2013b, 63). The main piece of evidence the report 
provides to argue this case is that, “the absence of any surge in the productivity of fleets 
operating in piracy-affected areas after 2005 is consistent with the absence of evidence of 
overfishing” (World Bank Group 2013b, 58). The report also notes a 26.8 percent decrease 
in catches in the southwestern Indian Ocean, and, after 2006, a 23.8 percent reduction in 
the export of fishing products from East African countries (World Bank Group 2013b, 57). 
In other words, the World Bank argues that if overfishing was occurring in the region then 
that would be reflected by larger recorded catches and greater exports, yet the opposite is 
happening. Instead of crediting this significant decrease to shipping companies avoiding the 
region out of unwillingness to incur the excess insurance and/or security costs of operating 
in piracy infested waters, the fear of being attacked by pirates (whose activity escalated 
unceasingly after 2005 until around 2011), complications related to climate change, or other 
legitimate reasons, the report offers this as evidence against overfishing by international 
vessels—evidence I deem insufficient.  
The report contends, “Fishing was never an important economic activity in Somalia, 
except perhaps in some coastal villages” (World Bank Group 2013b, 63). However, when 
one examines the regions where piracy is most common, such as in “some coastal villages,” 
the importance of the fishing industry cannot be overstated. The mistake that this report 
makes is not to contextualize piracy within Somalia, and it therefore minimizes the role of 
the fishery industry to some regions in Somalia.  
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As noted in the World Bank’s own report (2013b, 88), piracy has largely emerged in 
one specific region in Somalia: Puntland. I would argue that at least with regards to the 
autonomous state of Puntland, the World Bank report has insufficiently acknowledged the 
importance of the fishery industry. According to Puntland’s own website: “The fishing 
industry provides direct employment to thousands of people during the eight-month fishing 
season, as well as indirect employment for people working in restaurants and enterprises. 
During the fishing season, temporary settlements are created along the coastline where 
women take goods for sale to earn income. The fishing industry is ranked as the second 
highest income earner for the population of Puntland, after livestock” (Puntland State of 
Somalia, 2014). The four main economic activities for the region of Puntland include 
livestock, fishery, agriculture, and remittances (Puntland State of Somalia, 2014). Should any 
one of these major sources of revenue for Puntland be endangered, there would be many 
deleterious consequences.  
Additionally, much research apart from the World Bank report, such as that 
included previously in this paper and that conducted by the German Institute for Economic 
Research, has determined that “Piracy has grown substantially in Somalia because foreign 
(also western) fishing fleets have illegally entered Somali waters, robbing local fishermen of 
their livelihood” (German-Foreign-Policy.com 2010). Therefore, I insist that, contrary to the 
World Bank’s assessment of all of Somalia, that illegal fishing by foreign trawlers in Somali 
waters was indeed a crucial component to the formation of piracy, specifically for coastal 
communities in Somalia.  
 
4.3.7 – Illegal dumping 
 Illegal dumping of toxic and nuclear waste off the Somali coast is the seventh factor 
that contributed to the rise of piracy in Somalia. With Somalia incapable of exerting federal 
authority, and “With no coast guard to defend its shores, Somalis began complaining that 
vessels from Asia and Europe were dumping toxic waste in their waters” (Washington 
Times 2009). This phenomenon functioned as another reinforcing factor in Somalia, which, 
when combined with issues of failed governance, help to create prime conditions for 
identity mobilization (Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 25). Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer 
add that, “Should environmental conditions that initially led to VNSA creation continue 
unabated or become further entrenched, individuals affected by or concerned with those 
conditions may become increasingly sympathetic to VNSA goals or become members 
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themselves” (2005, 23). Consequently, this additional destructive and unlawful action, 
compounded with other existing factors, helped to mobilize many coastal Somalis. 
 Illegal dumping is part of a larger phenomenon known as the black garbage market—
and it is big business, reportedly generating over US$22 billion in 2012 alone (Mayr 2013). 
While it is not clear exactly when the dumping started in Somalia, there is evidence for the 
activity in Somalia as early as 1992, when “in the Eeldher district of the region of Galgadud, 
in the center of Somalia, dark blue long barrels containing oily-liquid were found” (Grosse-
Kettler 2004, 29). Once samples from the barrels were analyzed, they were found to 
contain nuclear waste. And Eeldher was not alone. Four years later, similar findings were 
made in the Adale district (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 29). The 2004 tsunami that caused so 
much devastation in Somalia also provided evidence of the continued practice of illegal 
dumping off the Somali coast. According to the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP), “the [2004] tsunami washed rusting containers of toxic waste onto the shores of 
Puntland” (Project Censored 2010). What the UNEP discovered was many kinds of 
dangerous waste, including radioactive uranium, lead, heavy metals (including mercury), 
hospital waste, chemical waste, and industrial waste (Project Censored 2010). The Somali 
people themselves also exhibit evidence of this activity, experiencing ailments such as mouth 
bleeding, stomach bleeding, skin infections, and even more health problems (Project 
Censored 2010). Many Somalis have even died as a result of these toxic chemicals that 
pervade their environment (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 29),  
 Behind this black market arrangement are two other species of VNSAs, Somali 
warlords and the Italian mafia. These two VNSAs cooperated in pursuit of a mutually 
beneficial financial arrangement. Although, “In 1992, reports ran in the European press of 
‘unnamed European firms’ contracting with local warlords to dump toxic waste both in 
Somalia and off Somalia’s shores” (Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 126), the firms were 
simply fronts for the Italian mafia who were collaborating with warlords to transport 
“hundreds of thousands of tons” of toxic waste from European to Somalia (Thomas, Kiser, 
and Casebeer 2005, 127).  
Both the warlords and the mafia were successful because they offered their services 
for much less than what they would cost to be done legitimately. To dump the waste in 
Somali waters cost about US$11 per ton, yet it would cost thousands for it to be done 
legally and properly in Europe (Ashenkazi and Ceska 2009). As conflict already existed 
between many Somalis and the nation’s warlords, greater fury was focused at these 
outsiders continuously coming in, in different forms, worsening environmental and social 
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conditions for the Somali people. After decades of maltreatment from foreigners, Somalis 
were unable to see the destructive actions of an individual foreign ship as distinct from 
harmless international ships in the region. Fed up with constantly suffering at the hands of 
these international interlopers, many Somalis sought to defend their seas and take revenge 
against them. 
 
4.3.8 – The financial lure of piracy 
 The financial lure of engaging in piracy is the eighth factor that contributed to the 
formation of Somali pirates. In a country with a per capita income of less than 300 dollars 
per year (Shortland 2010), piracy presents itself as a risky yet rewarding enterprise, 
especially for young unemployed men  (Shortland 2010). This offering of such benefits is a 
key part of the recruitment phase of VNSA formation. In this phase, VNSA leaders offer 
various incentives to potential recruits in order to “close the deal” (Thomas, Kiser, and 
Casebeer 2005, 100) and secure new members for their cause.  
A central aspect of the Somali piracy model is the maintenance of bases on shore. In 
addition to the fact that these land bases provide opportunities for the pirates to re-group 
and re-supply, “the stark poverty [prevalent in these areas also] provides both a convenient 
recruitment base and an enabling environment with a low level of law and order” (Lehr 
2007, xi). Aside from the desire to take revenge on foreign ships and defend their territory, 
when prospective pirates decide whether or not to be part of a hijacking, they weigh the 
potential financial reward and the potential risks of the operation. Additionally, they 
consider the earnings associated with safer employment opportunities, such as fishing or 
herding (World Bank Group 2013b). As stated above, the per capita income for Somalis is 
less than US$300, yet with an average ransom payout of US$3.06 million21 (World Bank 
Group 2013b, 85), individuals who participate in piracy can earn $10,000 to $15,000 per 
hijacking (German-Foreign-Policy.com 2010). The first pirate to board a targeted ship is 
rewarded with an even greater share of the ransom paid, or some other kind of bonus, such 
as a sports utility vehicle (SUV) (World Bank Group 2013b). Aside from piracy, one of the 
only other ways for men, especially young men, to make reliable money is to be part of a 
militia for a warlord. However, the financial compensation for this opportunity is 
significantly less than what piracy can offer (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 4-5). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 At the height of Somali piracy, “In 2011, the average ransom [increased to] US$5.04 million” (World Bank 
Group 2013b, 94). 
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The payment that piracy offers is more than substantial, especially considering the 
country’s decades of constant conflict and reliance on international food aid (Hunter 2008). 
As a result of this development, many young Somali men now “actively seek to be 
recruited” (World Bank Group 2013b 111). What at first began when Somalis were 
mobilized against foreign fishermen and those dumping toxic waste in their waters became a 
treacherous yet rewarding opportunity for Somali men to earn an income and improve their 
quality of life (Ashenkazi and Ceska 2009). As a result, “Most of the pirates, observers say, 
are not former fishermen, but just poor folk seeking their fortune” (Tharoor 2009). 
Between 2005 and 2013, Somali pirates have reportedly earned between US$315 million to 
US$385 million (World Bank Group 2013b, 85). With this considerable influx of wealth, 
“towns that once were eroded by years of poverty and chaos are now bustling with 
restaurants, Land Cruisers [a type of SUV] and Internet cafes. Residents also use their gains 
to buy generators – allowing full days of electricity, once an unimaginable luxury in Somalia” 
(Hassan and Kennedy 2008). In Somalia, there are no legitimate employment opportunities 
that would have enabled such a lifestyle, which appeals to many men eager to obtain the 
same. This improvement in quality of life in pirate-occupied districts has even led many 
Somalis who do not participate in piracy to nonetheless condone its practice. 
 
4.3.9 – Corruption  
Pirates receive 30 percent of the ransom earned from hijacking ships, while 20 
percent goes to pirate leaders, 30 percent is offered as bribes to government officials, and 
the remaining 20 percent is used to build up capital, including guns, ammunition, fuel, food, 
cigarettes (Washington Times 2009), and khat (World Bank 2013b, 118). Although the 
Somali government is weak, it is still necessary for pirates to bring those that are a part of 
the frail government onto their side in order for piracy operations to be successful. Thomas, 
Kiser, and Casebeer explain that, “Challenging state authority, engaging in economic activity 
deemed inappropriate or conducted outside the white market, or pursuing goals generally 
deemed as socially undesirable make [VNSAs] targets of the state—or at least the part of 
the state that the VNSA has not been able to corrupt” (2005, 10). In other words, if the 
pirates are able to successfully corrupt members of the state, then they will have removed 
obstacles to piracy operations. Somali pirates have seen the importance of such activity and 
therefore readily offer bribes to officials in order to ease piracy operations. In the major 
havens of Somali piracy, Puntland and Central Somalia, this is done in two different ways. 
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Puntland pirates focus on bribing government officials, as the political actor there is the 
regional administration. In Central Somalia, pirates must appeal to “clan leaders, 
businessmen, and al-Shabaab militants [since there is a] higher degree of political 
fragmentation in that area” (World Bank Group 2013b, 143). By corrupting appropriate 
stakeholders by offering them kickbacks, pirates can ensure that they will be free to carry 
out their operations. 
 
4.3.10 – Additional factors 
 The following issues serve to reinforce and intensify the elements of socioeconomic 
deprivation, resource scarcity, and identity cleavages within Somalia. They are issues relating 
to the hawala system, arms trading, and the 2006 Ethiopian invasion. While these events and 
relationships bolster the conditions that perpetuate piracy in Somalia, they cannot be strictly 
applied to the genesis of the phenomenon, ergo they have been organized together as 
additional influential factors. 
 
Hawala 
Because “this informal banking-system lacks transparency” Grosse-Kettler 2004, 20), 
it has been used by Somali businessmen to launder money. The hawala system also allows 
investors from around the world to participate in Somali piracy schemes. Pirates market 
their endeavors just as any entrepreneur would when looking for a financial backer, and 
once an agreement is made, the investors use the hawala system to transfer money to 
Somalia to help fund a piracy operation. When a ransom is paid after a successful hijacking, 
the pirates again use the hawala system to ensure that the sponsor receives the return on 
his investment and so transfer the backer’s portion of the earnings to him (Grosse-Kettler 
2004).  
A secondary impact involving the hawala system occurred after the terrorist attacks 
on the US by Islamic extremists on September 11, 2001. After this event, the US accused 
Somalia of financing Islamic terrorism and therefore took action against the state, freezing 
major hawala assets in Somalia. Unfortunately, as many Somalis rely on the hawala system to 
be able to receive financial assistance from relatives living outside Somalia, the closure 
severely affected the poorest Somalis (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 20-21). This contributed to an 
even more desperate economic situation in Somalia.  
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Arms trading 
Relationships with actors from around the world enable the formation and 
maintenance of VNSAs in Somalia. The international trading of weapons is an especially 
crucial reinforcing factor since it facilitates violence in the forms of defense and coercion 
(Grosse-Kettler 2004, 31). Somalis have acquired weapons through willing participants from 
Yemen, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, and even as far as Poland (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 
26-27; World Bank Group 2013b). Djibouti officials have allegedly falsified certificates to aid 
in the profitable transfer of arms to Somalia. Using these certificates, other international 
dealers have become involved in the trade—even from as far away as Bulgaria (Grosse-
Kettler 2004, 27). “Through arms trade with Somali factions, external donors fuel the 
armed conflict and support an insecure environment” (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 25), thereby 
perpetuating an enabling environment for piracy. Yet there are also actors propagating the 
circumstances from within Somalia. Using the hawala system, arms dealers in Mogadishu 
receive deposits for arms orders. Their militiamen then deliver the weapons and are paid 
the remaining balance at that time (Hunter 2008). As long as there are those willing to deal 
and trade in the underground arms market, pirates will be able to equip themselves for 
attacks. 
 
Ethiopian invasion 
Somalia has had long-standing conflict with its neighbor Ethiopia, but in 2006, a US 
backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia further escalated the conflict. Their actions were 
driven by the rise of the ICU in Somalia. Although the US encouraged negotiations between 
the ICU and the TFG to find a way to co-rule Somalia, some members of the ICU refused 
to compromise. Reportedly, the ICU “incited Ethiopia by making irredentist claims on its 
territory, by hosting two insurgent groups opposed to Addis Ababa [Ethiopia’s capital], and 
by expanding ties with Eritrea, which has a long-standing border dispute with Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia responded by invading in December 2006” (Kaplan 2010, 85). Together, Ethiopian 
and TFG troops responded by indiscriminately attacking neighborhoods, causing injury to 
innocent civilians, robbing, and raping. Many Somalis were radicalized as a result  (Kaplan 
2010, 86). The engagement proved extremely violent and deadly, with 16,000 killed in the 
conflict (Axe 2009). In the midst of the chaos, pirates committed to their cause with greater 
fortitude and increased their number of hijackings and the distance they were willing to 
travel off the coast to seize a valuable ship. 
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4.3.11 – Summary 
 A main aim of this thesis was to recognize which factors and actors played a part in 
the ecology of piracy. I also aimed to identify the niches of these factors and actors involved 
in the phenomenon’s relational field. Through the research process I was able to identify the 
above factors as key contributors to the formation of Somali pirates and I was able to 
evaluate the nature of their influence. Clearly, Somalia’s unstable and dangerous political 
environment, the violence associated with competing non-state actors, maritime poaching, 
natural disasters and resource scarcity, etc. made piracy a viable professional option. While 
initial hijackings may have been motivated more by frustration and the need for revenge, 
leading to activities such as unofficial taxation in the absence of a functioning government 
able to demand official taxation from international vessels, this was not the sole factor that 
contributed to the rise of piracy in Somalia. Rather, it was the combination of these factors 
that proved to be so potent and transformative. Collectively each factor can be considered 
responsible for the formation of Somali pirates.  
 
4.4 – Actions taken to eliminate the threat of Somali piracy 
Through this research, I have determined that actions taken in the attempt to 
eliminate Somali piracy can be characterized in four ways: External (international) and 
militaristic, external and non-militaristic, internal (Somali efforts) and militaristic, and internal 
and non-militaristic. Below I elaborate and offer examples of each of these approaches in 
order to assess their strategic effectiveness in the short- and long-term.  
 
4.4.1 – Actions taken by external actors 
International governments view the Somalia pirate phenomenon as solely a security 
issue, and that is how they have addressed it. The significant decrease in Somali pirate 
attacks is largely credited to this approach (World Bank Group 2013b, 88). However, these 
significant reductions come at a cost. At least 60 countries collaborate with 20 other 
organizations to eliminate the threat of piracy (World Bank Group 2013b, 157). Three main 
coalitions have emerged from these efforts: the European Union Operation Atalanta of the 
European Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR), Operation Ocean Shield from the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Combined Maritime Task Forces 151 (CFT-
151). They all work together to provide about 20 vessels charged with protecting ships 
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transporting goods around the Horn of Africa (World Bank Group 2013b, 158). At the 
height of Somali piracy in 2011, the threat of hijackings impelled these coalitions to provide 
32 vessels, four aircraft, and 1,800 personnel to carry out counter-piracy measures—
measures that cost these coalitions at least US$1.27 billion (World Bank Group 2013b, 
158). However, with roughly US$1.62 trillion worth of goods transported on ships traveling 
through waters that are vulnerable to Somali pirate attacks, and with piracy contributing to 
an economic loss of US$18 billion22 annually, there is a clear financial motive for many 
international actors to actively work to end Somali piracy.  
It is also important to note that there has never been any pirate attack on any ships 
that have had an armed guard present (World Bank Group 2013b, 158). While most 
governments and the IMO had previously discouraged the hiring of armed guards aboard 
ships (World Bank Group 2013b, 159), their use has increased dramatically. Now, between 
40 and 50 percent of ships transiting off the Somali coast employ armed guards (World 
Bank Group 2013b, 159). Despite the fact that the hiring of armed guards costs between 
US$170 million to US$530.6 million annually (World Bank Group 2013b, 159), shipping 
owners are willing to invest in such protection—and that has made an impact. Reductions in 
the number of hijackings can be credited to “the presence of onboard private armed 
security – which has shifted from being a niche market to a multi-million dollar norm – and 
the changed tactics adopted by international naval forces – from blanket maritime patrols to 
more intelligence-led activities” (Li 2013). Both of these tactics are credited with greatly 
assisting in the demise of Somali piracy. 
The increase in naval deployments and the implementation of armed security aboard 
shipping vessels has contributed to reductions in Somali pirate activity. There were 49 
successful hijackings in 2010, 28 in 2011, and only 14 in 2012 (Bridger 2013). While these 
methods have been effective at diminishing the threat of Somali piracy, they will only do so 
as long as they remain vigilant and in the area, which is a costly and time-consuming 
commitment. Militaristic approaches from external actors have proven to be effective at 
reducing piracy, but they are not the best solution in the long run. This is especially true 
since these strategies target the outcomes of the phenomenon of piracy, rather that the 
roots. Therefore a strictly militaristic approach from external forces cannot be relied upon 
to make a lasting impact on Somali piracy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 These figures are reportedly accompanied by “a margin of error of roughly US$6 billion” (World Bank 
Group 2013b, 7). 
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In addition to naval resources from the international community, another key effort 
to reducing hijackings came from the International Maritime Organization (IMO). As most 
recently as 2011, the IMO recommended best management practices (BMPs) for shipping in 
piracy-prone waters (World Bank Group 2013b, 158). The IMO’s BMPs are concrete 
instructions to “avoid or deter pirate attacks; [including] information about high-risk areas 
and the typical modus operandi of a pirate attack, [as well as] the appropriate course of 
action in response” (World Bank Group 2013b, 158). The UN has noted that ships that 
adhere to these BMPs have greatly reduced their risk of being hijacked (World Bank Group 
2013b, 158).  
The IMO has also called for more market-oriented solutions, such as the proposed 
embargo against Somalia’s exports (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 7). The IMO aimed to force 
the Somali government to take greater action against piracy itself, but this is something that 
was not really possible given the incapacitated state of the Somali government. 
Furthermore, as the financial reward of piracy remained high and other motivating 
conditions persisted, an embargo would likely have been a futile approach (Lehr and 
Lehmann 2007, 7).  
Additional efforts have been carried out by the UN Political Office for Somalia 
(UNPOS), the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP), and the IMO. They have helped to strengthen domestic laws in several 
countries, enhance their systems of prosecution, and increase their capacity for detention of 
pirates (World Bank Group 2013b, 159). While this approach involves international 
institutions coming to the aid of countries affected by Somali piracy, external actors have 
also developed strategies to improve the situation within Somalia itself. The Somalia Aid 
Coordination Body’s (SACB’s) main goal is to enhance Somalia’s national labor force. It is 
concerned with issues such as food security, rural development, health, nutrition, water 
resources, sanitation, and infrastructure. It also seeks to put governmental structures into 
practice, which SACB claims “would support local power rather than install one central 
authority” (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 30). However, a prerequisite to receive aid from SACB is 
a relative situation of peace and stability, consistent with their aim of reinforcing peace-
building efforts (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 30). While the goals of the SACB are undoubtedly 
critical to restoring order and improving livelihoods in Somalia, such an approach makes 
those that adhere to the SACB’s guidelines vulnerable to VNSA outbursts, which could ruin 
their opportunity to receive financial aid and structural support. An additional complication 
is that this is yet another outsider coming in to fix Somalia’s problems. And, as many Somalis 
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(especially those in al-Shabaab territory) increasingly want outsiders, even those with good 
intentions, to leave their country (Mohamed 2014), organizations like this may not prove to 
be as effective as hoped. 
Somalia has received US$8 billion from international bodies since 1991. The aid has 
been given in the hopes of installing a strong central government in Somalia (Kaplan 2010, 
81). Yet, Kaplan laments that efforts such as these have only served to worsen conflict in 
Somalia. He explains that the problem with such a solution derives from:  
 
Its unimaginative approach to state-building [which] seriously misreads the Somali 
sociopolitical context, showing little understanding for how a top-down strategy 
impacts the state’s fluid, fragmented, and decentralized clan structures. To make 
matters worse, the mistakes of the past are constantly being repeated, thanks to 
weak institutional memory (made worse by high turnover in embassies, aid agencies, 
and international organizations within the region); an unimaginative, uncritical, and 
template-driven approach to state-building; and a lack of accountability on the part 
of external donors, defense agencies, and aid organizations for the consequences of 
their failed policies (Kaplan 2010, 89). 
 
The conflicts within Somalia, including the formation of Somali pirates, are complex. In 
order for solutions to be effective in the long-term they must be implemented within the 
sociopolitical context of Somalia. They must also incorporate Somali cultural practices, 
rather that impose Western notions of governance. 
 
4.4.2 – Actions taken by internal actors 
In addition to responses from outsiders, solutions to piracy have also emerged from 
within Somalia itself. In this section I overview Somalia’s militaristic methods then move to 
discuss their non-combative approaches. However, it should be noted that most of the 
solutions proposed by Somali individuals, organizations, or offices are supported with either 
financial or human capital from abroad. 
In recent years, official military forces, police, and coast guard divisions were 
founded in Somaliland, Puntland’s neighbor (World Bank Group 2013b, 147). Additionally, 
the administration of the Galmudug district also plans to follow suit. However, it has taken 
action by opening one of the biggest prisons in the entire region (World Bank Group 2013b, 
161). Similar actions have even been launched in Puntland. The Puntland Maritime Police 
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Force (PMPF) is a paramilitary force that is armed and funded by the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and has been operating in Puntland for the last four years (Li 2013). Purportedly, 
“Headed by the son of Puntland’s president and allegedly commanded by former South 
African army officers, the PMPF’s operations up and down the coast have been pivotal in 
reducing pirate bases on the coast of Puntland” (Li 2013). Though several sources maintain 
that the PMPF has contributed to improved policing and reductions in hijackings (Li 2013; 
Weldemichael and Hassan 2012), there are still questions of internal corruption and 
affiliation with pirates (World Bank Group 2013b, 161). In addition to building up forces to 
execute anti-piracy measures, with international assistance, Puntland has built new prisons 
and strengthened its legal system, leading to the arrest of 290 Somali pirates (World Bank 
Group 2013b, 161). In order to better accomplish counter-piracy operations, Puntland has 
also established a navy base in Bandar Siyada, a village about 25km (15.5mi) west of 
Puntland’s commercial capital of Bosaso (Horseed Media 2010). A key way that such new 
infrastructure is helping to diminish piracy in Somalia is by offering Somalis a chance at an 
honest way to earn a living. While such strategies can only be successful as long as piracy 
and other dangers such as illegal fishing and illegal dumping remain a concern, it is still a 
good step forward in reducing socioeconomic deprivation on the ground. 
Most previous (and current) strategies to combat piracy in Somalia have included 
military intervention at sea as well as support to help improve prison infrastructure and 
increase prosecution of pirates, but more recently, there have also been efforts developed 
internally (often with international support, however) to reduce piracy from within. 
Additional approaches from within Somalia have included attempts at interrupting the piracy 
business model, increasing market wages, and developing non-state organizations with the 
aim of rehabilitating pirate veterans and increasing awareness around the risks of piracy 
(World Bank 2013b). For example, the Youth Organization Against Piracy (YOAP) was 
established in 2011 in Puntland and focuses on providing socio-economic solutions for youth 
in the region (World Bank Group 2013b, 162). There is even a Somali organization called 
Fathers Against Piracy that aims to stop their daughters and other women in pirate 
communities from becoming pirate prostitutes (Osman 2013). Another main effort to 
reduce piracy from within has included increasing prosecution and detention of pirates 
(World Bank Group 2013b, 159). While increasing criminalization encourages potential 
pirates to avoid participating in such a venture, this attempt to combat piracy is yet another 
that does not resolve the roots of the issue, which are largely socioeconomic and political. 
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However, the community-based and community-focused strategies are likely to be far more 
convincing than the strategies that operate through threat. 
In 2012, the TFG transitioned to the Federal Government of Somalia (SFG) at which 
time President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was inaugurated. He immediately called for an end 
to piracy within Somalia (World Bank Group 2013b, 161), even offering amnesty to some 
arrested pirates (Bridger 2013). While it is still not clear whether pirates will follow the 
president’s demands, several hostages held by pirates were released after his call to action. 
(World Bank Group 2013b, 161). 
Perhaps a more persuasive counter-piracy force is Afweyne, a man considered to be 
one of the fathers of piracy in Somalia. After years of leading attacks, Afweyne has since 
renounced piracy and established the Somali Anti-Piracy Agency based in Mogadishu. He has 
asked for assistance in providing training and rehabilitation for former pirates seeking to 
reform themselves. The former pirate boss and his son also attempted to negotiation a 
trade in which the Hobyo-Harardhere Piracy Network would relinquish its hostages in 
return for a US$2 million payment from the SFG. However, the “deal reportedly collapsed 
over a misappropriation of funds and internal disagreement that left one pirate negotiator 
dead” (Bridger 2013). While rehabilitation and skills training could prove to be valuable 
assets against the lure of piracy, the organizations that would provide this service still need 
more resources in order to be effective.  
 
4.4.3 – Summary 
While many international actors have economic reasons to assist in alleviating piracy, 
resolving such a phenomenon must include addressing the factors that contributed to its 
formation. Such a strategy that would focus on reducing violence, reinforcing clan structures 
and leadership, and expanding economic opportunities for Somalis is likely to also be 
supported by the Somali people—which means it would likely be more effective as a long-
term solution to VNSA formation in Somalia. 
 
5 – Discussion 
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5.1 – Recommendations for action 
While attempts to thwart piracy have largely been militaristic, in the past several 
years there have been calls to focus on more context-appropriate diplomatic and 
socioeconomic support to curb piracy. Ashenkazi and Ceska explain that, “For anti-piracy 
actions to be effective, they must be matched by efforts to help stabilize the political, 
economic, and humanitarian situation in the country” (2009). While such a strategy is a 
much more complex task than simply forcing pirates to cower away from big guns and 
decades long prison sentences, such changes will be more stabilizing and beneficial in the 
long run. In keeping with my aim to consolidate the ecology of piracy, proposed solutions 
should focus on this network as well as the roots of the phenomenon. Below, I offer 
solutions that address most of the factors that contributed to the rise of Somali piracy. 
 
5.1.1 – Socioeconomic opportunity 
Socioeconomic deprivation was one of the main contributing factors to the rise in 
Somali piracy. With limited means to secure a stable livelihood, many Somalis became 
desperate and sought access to the wealth that piracy offered. Thomas, Kiser, and 
Caserbeer argue that, “when done correctly, social and economic development policies can 
weaken local support for [VNSA] activities and discourage potential [VNSA] recruits” 
(2005, 24). Such an approach has proved successful in the case of Spain’s Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty or ETA). In this case, with improved economic 
conditions and greater societal disdain for violence came a reduced pool of potential 
recruits, and therefore reduced efficacy by the ETA (Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 
91). Several parties wishing to assist in the development of Somalia have taken this into 
account. The World Bank has called for the expansion of Somalia’s fishing industry and 
compensation packages to replace the previous income generated from piracy, as well as 
improved police capacity (2013b, 174). The International Contact Group also urges for the 
implementation of employment and income-generating opportunities (World Bank Group 
2013b, 162). Some such efforts are already taking place in Somalia, including the provision of 
“business training and seed money to start up economic activities” (World Bank Group 
2013b, 162). While it remains to be seen whether or not such solutions will be applied, and 
especially applied effectively, it is clear that reducing economic incentives for individuals to 
participate in acts of piracy is crucial to a long-term resolution. 
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5.1.2 – Fortifying political stability and clan ties 
Arguably, the most significant factor that contributed to the rise of piracy in Somalia 
was political instability. Therefore, solutions that aim to restore political stability in Somalia 
would prove to be highly impactful. The World Bank adds that, “long-term eradication of 
piracy off the Horn of Africa cannot be dissociated from the construction of viable and 
accountable state structures, both central and decentralized” (2013b, 173-174). What this 
means, and what others have also called for, is that in addition to a stronger central Somali 
governmental body, it is also important to incorporate bottom-up approaches to 
governance, including regional leadership from clans and subclans (Dehérez 2009; World 
Bank Group 2013b, 173-174; Kaplan 2010, 90).  
Kaplan laments that, “Somalia embodies one of postcolonial Africa’s worst 
mismatches between conventional state structures and indigenous customs and institutions” 
(2010, 82). He adds that, “The international community should work directly with the clans 
and subclans, helping them build a series of regional governments patterned after those now 
operating in Somaliland and Puntland, and that have operated from time to time elsewhere” 
(2010, 89). Although some still rally for the reinstatement of the ICU (Axe 2009), Kaplan 
argues that the most potent strategies will be the ones that capitalize on the capabilities and 
capacities of traditional forms of governance in Somalia (Kaplan 2010, 93). This is in line 
with Dehérez’ assertion that regulation, in the context of Somalia, can only be effective if it 
as executed at a local level. Ideally, this would be done with the assistance of international 
actors who would provide financial, military, and political support to regional clan-based 
governments so that they can begin exercising greater authority and providing social 
services themselves (Kaplan 2010, 91). This is different from the type of assistance 
international governments have offered in the past as it focuses on the support of regional 
governance, rather than enforcing a central authority. Because of this distinction, the 
external support is likely to be much more welcomed than it has been in the past. 
Despite the fact that Somalis share a common ethnicity, language, and religion, they 
remain distinct from each other due to their clan identities (Kaplan 2009). However, clans 
have used their traditional methods of governance and leadership to instill order in many 
parts of Somalia, and in doing so, have been able to resolve disputes and encourage 
investment (Kaplan 2009). By working with these groups directly, traditional informal 
leadership could give way to more formal local governments, which could be supported 
initially by foreign aid. In this way, “bottom-up approaches in conflict resolution might be 
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developed on a broader basis and in the end be more effective in a country that is still best 
described as a pastoral society” (Dehérez 2009). Although friction between various identity 
groups has created deep divides throughout Somalia’s history, clans and their associated 
methods of governance may actually prove to be instrumental in stabilizing Somalia’s 
political situation. 
 
5.1.3 – Alleviating identity cleavages 
The removal of socio-economic barriers between conflicting groups can alleviate 
tension and decrease the desire for new members to join a violent organization (Thomas, 
Kiser, and Casebeer 2005, 24). By strengthening traditional structures of governance, these 
local institutions will increase their capacity to maintain law and order and be able to devote 
greater effort to other important issues (Kaplan 2010, 91). While this would require 
support from foreign militaries “if the outside force was composed of troops from non-
African Muslim states (such as Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Pakistan) instead of AU [African 
Union] peacekeepers, it might enjoy greater local support and attract fewer accusations of 
‘’infidel’ interference in Somali affairs” (2010, 93). Furthermore, if some external actors 
involved facilitated negotiations between disputing Ethiopia and Eritrea, stability could 
spread throughout the entire region (Kaplan 2010, 93).  
 
5.1.4 – Terminating illegal fishing and illegal dumping 
International actors and the coalitions they form must keep illegal fishing on their 
agenda. Eliminating poachers would have two effects on Somalia’s future: (1) to remove a 
source of anger from Somali fishermen toward international vessels, and (2) to ensure that 
Somalia’s EEZ is protected. In accordance with the second effect, the resources off Somalia 
that lie within its EEZ could then be put to use and enjoyed by the Somali people 
themselves. Until Somalia can exercise authority over its EEZ itself, “the anti-piracy coalition 
[of navies operating in Somalia] must also ensure that the plundering of Somalia’s seas be 
brought to halt, and the maritime area be kept in trust for the people of Somalia” 
(Ashenkazi and Ceska 2009). Such actions would also effectively remove the ability of 
international actors to continue to dump illegal waste off Somalia’s coast and therefore 
alleviate another contributing factor. 
 
5.1.5 – Interrupting piracy operations 
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As stated previously, a key element of the Somali piracy model is its use of safe 
anchorage points throughout Somalia’s extensive coastline. When pirate groups themselves 
do not control the territory of these areas, Somali pirates have been known to build 
alliances and offer other VNSAs a portion of the ransom earned in order to secure the 
hijacked ship. Although the World Bank argues that piracy would be far less lucrative if 
these anchorage points were no longer accessible (2013a), this would require addressing 
Somalia’s other VNSAs, such as the insurgent group al-Shabaab. While intervening in the 
piracy business model would undoubtedly make Somali piracy operations more difficult, 
such a solution is only possible when stable regional governments are implemented.   
 
5.1.6 – Addressing reinforcing factors 
Strategies to end piracy in Somalia must also address the vast network of 
international actors always at the ready to play their part in Somali piracy operations, from 
supplying weapons and other equipment, financing operations, to assisting with money 
laundering. The UNODC charges that building up national and regional law enforcement 
agencies, supporting the regulation against money laundering, and creating a comprehensive 
program to disrupt financial streams would most help to confront these actors (World Bank 
Group 2013b, 160). Although this still leaves those in powerful positions open to 
temptation by VNSAs who wish to corrupt them, enacting legal infrastructure is one way to 
help bolster Somalia’s ability to govern. However, such an approach requires external 
assistance, so its success will depend on how dedicated the UNODC is to this cause and on 
how open the Somali people are to receiving the external support. 
Another key aspect of successful piracy operations is the use of weapons and 
military equipment. Despite the UN Security Council’s embargo on imported weapons to 
Somalia, many countries have participated in arms trading with the country. Proposals from 
the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia to address this include enhancing sanctions on violators 
or blocking their ability to complete the associated financial transactions (Grosse-Kettler 
2004, 31). While some research is being carried out to see how this could be accomplished 
(SBS News 2014), no clear methods have been established. Other recommendations include 
better monitoring and international condemnation of Ethiopia should the nation again decide 
to militarily intervene in Somalia, as well as additional embargos on arms exports for 
Djibouti and Yemen (Grosse-Kettler 2004, 31). Although the embargos are legitimate steps 
forward in the cessation of arms dealing, such trading is largely underground and therefore 
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cannot be completely stopped by state regulation. An additional suggestion has been to 
establish a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) campaign in Somalia 
(Grosse-Kettler 2004, 31). According to the UNDDR Centre, “The objective of the DDR 
process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that 
recovery and development can begin” (2014). However, DDR campaigns can only be 
effective when there is some basic level of security and political stability. While Somalia may 
not yet be ready for this approach, such a recommendation could indeed prove useful to 
Somalia in the future, as long as the Somali people are open to receiving support from 
outsiders. 
 
5.2 – Summary 
Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer claim that “Violence grows where desperation lingers” 
(2005, 47), and that has certainly been the case in Somalia. While only some of the pirates 
emerged as a pseudo Somali Navy, the phenomenon overall was driven by a combination of 
factors that contributed to an environment of despair, anxiety, and uncertainty. While I 
hope I have explained why these circumstances make the pirates’ actions understandable, a 
sustainable C-VNSA strategy in Somalia would need to target these circumstances more 
than the phenomenon of piracy itself as piracy in Somalia will not be vanquished by military 
force alone (German-Foreign-Policy.com 2010). What is needed is a combination of 
international support and internal motivation. By focusing on more local, bottom-up 
solutions that target the roots of piracy, or the initial motives of the pirates, peace and 
stability are far more likely.  
If international bodies continue to fail to recognize the culture and norms of the 
country they wish to assist, then they will only perpetuate conflict in Somalia, rather than 
aiding in a well-received and practical resolution. What Kaplan recommends is that “Instead 
of repeatedly trying to foist a Western style top-down state structure on a deeply 
decentralized society, the international community should work with Somalia's long-standing 
traditional institutions to build a bottom-up government” (Kaplan 2009). Such an approach 
would empower the local population and create a path toward self-reliance. While some 
may criticize the involvement of international actors at all, because of the various VNSAs 
operating in Somalia, many factors and conflicts are likely to persist in the relational field 
unless there is some kind of intervention. Although Somalis are capable of taking initiative 
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themselves, when facing violent actors such as warlords with their own militias, it is helpful 
to have external support until the situation becomes more stable. 
As piracy becomes less opportune, past or would-be pirates often look to other 
illicit activities in search of other equally rewarding pay-offs. As the alternatives of 
kidnapping for ransom and human trafficking (World Bank 2013b; Grosse-Kettler 2004) are 
just as dangerous, illicit, and unsustainable as piracy, it remains clear that solutions to 
eliminate piracy in Somalia should aim to help build up Somalia’s socioeconomic and 
governmental infrastructure by incorporating the state’s own social and political networks. 
In order for C-VNSA solutions to have meaningful impact in Somalia, they must be context-
specific, must address the specific species of VNSA in question, and they must be supported 
by the targeted indigenous population. Additionally, strategies that aim to eliminate a VNSA 
must tackle the roots of formation rather than only employing tactics to address the 
outcomes of VNSA activity. Lastly, it is clear that military intervention is not a long-term 
solution and should not be incorporated as such (Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer 2005).  
While the specific conditions, factors, and actors that played a part in the ecology of 
Somali piracy are unique, the principles noted in VNSA theory by Thomas, Kiser, and 
Casebeer could be applied to a multitude of other types of VNSAs. If one considers the 
influence of resource scarcity, demographic pressures, socioeconomic deprivation, 
organized crime and corruption, and pre-existing identity cleavages—especially in situations 
of political instability, socioeconomic despair, and environmental and social injustice, it 
becomes easier to identify where VNSAs are likely to appear. Accordingly, it is only by 
addressing these dynamics that successful C-VNSA strategy can be developed. It is only by 
targeting the root causes of such a phenomenon and the niches that the associated actors 
exploit that such a situation can move from one of violence to one of peace. 
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